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When Your Suffering Becomes Mine: 
The Influence of Social Comparison Orientation on 
Affect Resulting in a Willingness to Help Others  
Just like other primates, humans need the help of others to survive. Because 
receiving help from others also requires a willingness to help others in return, it is not 
surprising that people are often affected by the suffering of others. Yet, people differ in 
the way in which this suffering affects them. This chapter argues that these individual 
differences are not only strongly dependent on the perspective from which one views the 
suffering of the other, but are also dependent on the degree in which one compares 
oneself with the person in need.  
Depending on the perspective one takes, observing someone in need will have 
different affective implications for the observer (Batson, 1991; Batson et al., 1997a). For 
instance, one can imagine how the other must perceive the situation, and consequently, 
which affect that situation will arouse in the other (other perspective1). One can also try to 
stay objective and not to get involved in the suffering of the person in need (objective 
perspective). Research has repeatedly shown that imagining how the other person must feel 
leads to higher levels of empathy (an other-oriented emotion) and distress (a self-oriented 
emotion) than trying to stay objective, and that these emotions in turn predict helping the 
other (Batson et al. 1997a; Batson et al. 1997b; Cialdini et al., 1987). Yet, not everyone 
who takes a certain perspective will experience the same emotions. Obviously, besides the 
perspective one takes, other factors come also into play. One of these factors is the extent 
to which one compares oneself with others.  
The desire to learn about the self through comparison with others is assumed to be 
a universal characteristic of humans (Buunk & Gibbons, 2005). Yet, many individuals are 
reluctant to admit engaging in social comparison (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Helgeson & 
Taylor, 1993). This reluctance can be partly explained by the fact that people differ in 
                                                           
1We fully agree with Maner, et al. (2002) that referring to this perspective as ‘empathy manipulation’ may be 




their disposition to compare themselves with others (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Hemphill 
and Lehman, 1991). To capture these differences, Gibbons and Buunk (1999) developed 
a scale that assesses individual differences in what they labelled social comparison orientation 
(SCO; the disposition to compare oneself with others). A variety of studies have shown a 
quite clear pattern of behaviour of individuals high in SCO. According to Buunk and 
Gibbons (2005), the “typical” comparer is characterized by features such as: a chronic 
activation of the self, a strong interest in what others feel, and a moderate negative 
affectivity. One of the strongest correlates of SCO is interpersonal orientation, i.e., the 
need to have close interpersonal relationships (r = .45, p < .001; Buunk & Gibbons, 
2005). Also, SCO is correlated moderately (r = .31, p < .001) with communal orientation, 
i.e., a desire to give benefits in response to the perceived needs of others (Clark et al., 
1987). At the very least, these correlates suggest that people high in SCO have a strong 
interest in the experiences and feelings of others surrounding them. But what does this 
interest do with the resulting affect felt for these persons? More specifically, when 
confronted with a person in need, do people high in SCO respond with a different affect 
than people low in SCO?  
Surprisingly little research is conducted on the influence of social comparison with 
a victim on the willingness to help that person. Yet, studies on the relationship between 
SCO and affect felt for downward comparison targets (people who are worse off) provide 
us with some clues which may be applicable to person in need situations. A number of 
studies have shown that for people high in SCO, particularly downward comparisons 
evoke negative affect. For instance, Buunk et al. (2001) asked sociotherapists high in SCO 
to read a bogus interview about someone involved in the same profession being very 
unsuccessful. The higher the level of burnout of the sociotherapists, the more negative 
affect was evoked by the description of the downward comparison target, but only among 
individuals high in SCO. In a similar study, a sample of nurses was exposed to either a 
downward or an upward target. The higher individuals were in SCO, the more negative 
affect they reported following exposure to the downward comparison target (Buunk et al., 
2001). Although these studies provide us with some insights in the affective reactions of 
people high in SCO, the need of the comparison targets in these situations was not very 
strong (compared to the need of a victim). Yet, these findings suggest that people high in 
SCO may be more sensitive to the suffering of others than people low in SCO and that 
this sensitivity results in higher levels of negative affect. This seems to occur because 
people high in SCO relate the situation of that person to themselves, which makes them 
particularly inclined to imagine how that person must feel.  
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Although it seems clear that exposure to others who are relatively worse-off tends 
to evoke negative affect especially in those high in SCO, the precise nature of this affect is 
not completely clear. This reported negative affect can be an expression of peoples’ own 
distress in reaction to the need of the other as well as an expression of their empathy for 
the suffering of the other. The studies above did not provide their participants the 
opportunity to specify if this felt negative affect was a consequence of their empathic 
concern. Nevertheless, both the sensitivity for the suffering of the other, as well as the 
correlations of SCO with interpersonal orientation and communal orientation suggests 
that this negative affect might be an expression of empathy. And, when relating these 
findings to the research on perspective taking mentioned above, it seems likely that this 
empathy should be especially apparent when people high in SCO imagine how this 
person must feel.  
In sum, we expect that people who are induced to take an other perspective will 
experience more empathy –and not distress– for a person in need, and will be more 
willing to help that person than people who are induced to stay objective. This effect of 
perspective taking should be especially strong for people high in SCO and should also 
extend to their willingness to help this person. In Study 2.1, university students were 
presented with a person in need and were randomly assigned to take the perspective of 
this person or to stay objective. SCO, their willingness to help—as well as a number of 
putative predictors of helping—were assessed. Study 2.2 was designed to replicate 





Sixty-one female psychology students (mean age 20 years, SD 3.2 years, ranging 
from 18 to 37 years old) at the University of Groningen participated in exchange for 
course credits. Participants were randomly divided over two perspective-conditions: trying 
to stay objective (objective-condition) and imagining how the person described must feel 
(other-condition). 
Procedure 
The study was presented as a study on “personality and close relationships.” Upon 




that the research would consist of two unrelated parts, a short questionnaire and a study 
concerning a new practicum for first year psychology students. The practicum would 
teach students how to cope with stigmatized others by means of going out with them to 
develop new activities in their daily lives. The aim of the current study would be to gather 
students’ opinions on such a practicum, which would be taken into account by the 
university in the final make-up of the practicum. Participants read on their computer 
screens a story that gave them a global idea of the practicum. They also read an 
introduction on Leonie, a student who had a major bicycle accident and consequently 
ended up with serious facial damage, a shattered foot, and social stigma. She would tell in 
an interview about her experiences. 
Before listening to the interview, the experimental manipulation was introduced to 
the participants following Batson et al. (1997a): Those randomly assigned to the objective 
condition read the following: 
“Try, while listening to the interview, to be as objective as possible about what has happened 
to the person interviewed and how it has affected her life. To stay objective, it’s important not to 
imagine what this person has been through and how this has influenced her life. Just try 
to remain as objective as possible.” 
Those assigned to the other condition read: 
“Try, while listening to the interview, to imagine how the person being interviewed feels 
about what happened and how it has affected her life. Try not to concern yourself with attending 
to all the information presented. Just try to imagine how the person interviewed feels and 
concentrate on this.”  
The instruction stayed on the participants’ screen while listening to the interview. 
In the interview, Leonie told about her experiences in the hospital, how she felt when she 
saw herself again for the first time, how she has been recovering, and how she is feeling 
when people stare at her. She ended her story saying that she would like to meet some 
new people who would be willing to do something ‘nice’ with her. Participants then 
completed a set of questionnaires (described below); upon completion, participants were 
fully debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Measures  
Social Comparison Orientation. Social Comparison Orientation was measured with the 
Iowa-Netherlands comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
This 11-item scale was developed on the basis of a larger item pool, and has been tested 
in over 25 studies. The measure consists of statements reflecting social comparison 
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activities and interests. The items were measured on a 5-point scale, ranging from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Cronbach’s alpha was .77, M = 3.61, SD = .52. 
Manipulation checks. As part of the practicum evaluation form, two questions were 
designed to measure the effectiveness of the perspective-manipulation: “To what extent 
did you concentrate, while listening to the interview, on being objective?” and “To what 
extent did you concentrate, while listening to the interview, on the feelings of Leonie?”; 1 
(not at all) to 9 (very much). 
Empathy. Target-specific state empathy was measured with the adjectives sympathetic 
and compassionate (r = .75, p = .001). These two items are often included among the list of 
adjectives used to tap empathy in research on prosocial behaviour (see Batson, 1991, for a 
review). On 7-point scales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), participants indicated 
the extent to which they felt these emotions. 
Distress. Feelings of distress were measured with adjectives distressed, disturbed, and 
alarmed (alpha = .76). Participants provided responses on 7-point scales ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Willingness to help. Willingness to help was part of a broader questionnaire titled 
“Practicum Evaluation form” which asked some questions covering the cover story of the 
study. To measure helping intention, participants were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 (absolutely not) to 5 (definitely yes) whether they were willing to help Leonie in 
a practicum such as described previously. 
Results and Discussion 
The manipulation appeared successful. Participants in the objective condition 
reported more concentration on being objective (M = 6.39, SD = 1.33) than participants 
in the other condition (M = 4.73, SD = 1.41; F(1,59) = 22.12, p = .001). Also, participants 
in the other condition reported more concentration on the feelings of Leonie (M = 7.47, 
SD = .94) than participants in the objective condition (M = 5.74, SD = 1.6; F(1,59) = 
24.91, p = .001). 
Table 2.1 shows the mean levels of all measures in the objective condition and the 
other condition. As expected, participants experienced greater feelings of empathy in the 
other than in the objective condition, t(59) = 1.82, p = .036 one sided. Means on the 





Mean levels of Empathy, Distress, and Willingness to Help in Objective and Other Conditions 
 Empathy Distress Willingness to help 
 
Objective 
















Note. Means with different superscripts differ at least at p < .05. 
 
Of particular conceptual interest was whether SCO would be differently related to 
the dependent variables within the other condition in comparison with the objective 
condition. Correlations among these variables revealed some very clear differences 
between both conditions. The correlations are reported in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2 
Correlations among All Measures in Objective and Other Conditions 
 Objective condition Other condition 
 2 3 4 2 3 4 
1. SCO .08 .11 .13 .42* .26 .37* 
2. Empathy  .48** .07  .36* .49** 
3. Distress   .31   .27 
4. Willingness to help       
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
In the objective condition, SCO was unrelated to any of the other measures, 
whereas in the other condition, SCO was related to both empathy and participants’ 
willingness to help. There was no relationship between SCO and distress in either of the 
conditions. As expected, these correlations suggest a model in which people high in SCO 
experience more empathy than people low in SCO, especially when they take an other-
perspective.  
Because several of these predictors were correlated with each other (in both 
objective and other conditions), in order to test the independent effects of SCO, empathy 
and distress on willingness to help, we conducted two regression analyses, separately for 
the objective and other conditions. The results are reported in Table 2.3.  
 




Results of Regression Analyses in Objective and Other Conditions in which Willingness to Help was the Dependent 
Variable 
 Objective condition Other condition 
 Beta t p* Beta t p* 
Empathy -.10 -.50 .31 .38 2.00 .028 
Distress .35 1.68 .051 .08 .43 .34 
SCO .10 .56 .29 .19 1.03 .15 
 R-square = .11 R-square = .28 
Note. *Reported one sided. 
 
The results of the regression analyses showed that in the objective condition, 
people high in distress were more willing to help than people low in distress (β = .35, p = 
.051 one sided). When the other variables were controlled for, no other predictor exerted 
a significant effect. On the other hand, in the other condition, when people imagined how 
the recipient must have felt, empathy was the only substantive predictor of willingness to 
help (β = .38, p = .028 one sided). Although the correlation in Table 2.2 suggested a 
relationship between SCO and willingness to help in the other condition, these 
regressions show that the effect of SCO on willingness to help was due to the shared 
variance between SCO and empathy. In sum, when all putative predictors were pitted 
against each other, distress predicted willingness to help when the helper concentrated on 
being objective, whereas empathy predicted willingness to help when the helper imagined 
how the recipient must have felt.  
This study shows us that not only one’s perspective on a situation, but also the 
extent to which one is inclined to compare with others determines the affect felt for a 
person in need. More specifically, when people take an objective perspective on the 
situation, no relationship exists between SCO and distress, and willingness to help seems 
to be predicted only by the amount of distress one experiences. On the other hand, when 
people try to imagine how the recipient must feel, SCO is related to both empathy and 
willingness to help. Empathy in turn, is the main predictor of willingness to help, 
indicating a mediating role between SCO and willingness to help. 
Clearly, only within the other perspective, people high in SCO experience more 
empathy than people low in SCO. But the question remains why this is the case. We 
would like to suggest that this higher empathy occurs because people high in SCO 
identify more easily with the other. As Buunk and Gibbons (2005) pointed out, people 




recognize themselves in the other. To test this explanation we conducted a second study 
in which we added a measure of identification as well as a ‘close-other’ perspective. In this 
perspective, participants were to imagine the victim to be a person close to them. 
Identification was measured in terms of the amount of oneness (Aron et al., 1992) people 
experienced with the victim. Expected was that in the close-other condition, people 
would experience more oneness with the victim than in the other two perspectives.  
If the explanation of identification for people high in SCO holds true, people high 
in SCO should experience more feelings of oneness in the other condition than people 
low in SCO. This moderating role of SCO is not expected in the close-other condition 
since all people should identify with the victim in that condition. Neither is it expected in 
the objective condition because people –both high and low in SCO– are actively trying 




Hundred twenty-nine female students (mean age 21.02 years, SD 1.60 years, 
ranging from 18 to 26 years old) participated in exchange for the chance to win a DVD 
player. 
Procedure and Measures 
The experiment was conducted in the same way as that of Study 2.1, except for a 
few modifications. This time, participants were led to believe that the research was 
conducted to test an advertisement campaign for an existing Dutch institution called 
‘Victim Care’. This institution’s main focus is providing psychological support to people 
who have been recently the victim of some sort of trauma. The results of this study would 
be helping ‘Victim Care’ in determining how to conduct a follow-up national research. 
The experimental manipulation was identical to that of Study 2.1, except that a third 
perspective was added: a close-other perspective. Participants in the close-other condition 
first got the instruction to think of someone who was important to them and describe 
five characteristics of this person. While listening to the interview they had the same 
instruction as people in the other condition except that they had to imagine how it would 
be for the person they just described. 
Again, Leonie was described as having had serious facial damage, a shattered foot, 
and social stigma. SCO (alpha = .80, M = 3.33, SD = .39), empathy (r = .75, p = .001) 
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and distress (alpha = .79) were measured in the same manner as in Study 2.1. To assess 
identification with the recipient, oneness was measured using the Inclusion of Others in 
Self Scale (IOS; Aron et al., 1992). The IOS exists of seven drawings of two gradually 
more overlapping circles. To measure actual helping behaviour instead of willingness to 
help, the questionnaire ended with a letter of authority. On this letter, participants could 
indicate whether they would support ‘Victim Care’ by either, donating money, becoming a 
volunteer or becoming a collector for ‘Victim Care’2. 
Results and Discussion 
Analyses showed significant differences between the conditions for all three 
dependent variables: empathy, F (2,126) = 4,22, p = .017; distress, F (2,126) = 8,58, p = 
.001 and oneness, F (2,126) = 24,96, p = .001. Table 2.4 shows the mean levels of all 
measures in the three conditions.  
 
Table 2.4 
Mean levels of Empathy, Distress, and Oneness in Objective and Other Conditions 
 Empathy Distress Oneness 
Objective 
(n = 42) 
 
5.31 a 2.98 a 2.76 a 
Other 
(n = 44) 
 
5.80 b 3.23 a 4.07 b 
Close-other 
(n = 43) 
5.90 b 4.00 b 4.72 c 
Note. Means with different superscripts differ at least at p < .05. 
 
Contrasts revealed that participants experienced more empathy when taking an 
other-perspective (as in Study 2.1) and also when taking a close-other perspective than 
when staying objective. Also as expected, feelings of oneness differed significantly 
between all three conditions with participants experiencing more oneness in the close 
other condition as compared to the other- and objective conditions. Moreover, 
participants experienced higher levels of distress in the close-other condition than in 
either of the other conditions. Apparently, the close other condition was effective since it 
lead to the highest amount of felt oneness with the victim. In this condition both feelings 
                                                           
2 Due to the large amount of answering categories (divided over the three forms of helping, 13 in sum) and the 
few amount of people who answered positively to the letter of authority (less than 13%), it was impossible to do 
any meaningful analysis on this data. We have therefore chosen not to consider this helping measure in the 




of empathy and distress also raised substantially. But what was the role of SCO in relation 
to these dependent variables? To provide an answer to this question we took a closer look 
at the correlations (reported in Table 2.5).  
 
Table 2.5 
Correlations among All Measures in Objective, Other and Close-Other Conditions 
 Objective condition Other condition Close-Other condition 
 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
 
1. SCO 
.21 .43** -.03 .32* .09 .34* .37* .26 -.11 
 
2. Empathy 
 .22 .36*  .24 .56**  .29 .09 
 
3. Distress 
  .16   .46**   .27 
 
4. Oneness 
         
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Oneness We expected only an effect of SCO on feelings of oneness within the other 
perspective, with people high in SCO experiencing more oneness than people low in 
SCO. A moderated multiple regression analysis (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003, pp. 
375-378) with oneness as the dependent variable and both the main effects of the 
perspectives and SCO as well as the interactions between the perspectives and SCO as 
predictors revealed an overall model with R² = .32, F (5,126) = 11.39, p = .001. This 
model showed a main effect of the other condition versus the objective condition (b = 
1.34, t(84) = 4.79, p = .001) as well as a main effect of the close-other condition versus 
the objective condition (b = 1.94, t(83) = 7.0, p = .001). There was no main effect of SCO 
(b < -.03 ns.). The main effect of the other versus objective perspective was qualified by a 
trend towards an interaction between the perspectives and SCO (b = .45, t(83) = 1,63, p = 
.106). Although this interaction effect did not reach statistical significance, simple effect 
analysis within the perspectives showed once more a very clear pattern. Within the other 
perspective, people high in SCO experienced more oneness than people low in SCO (b = 
1,06, t(42) = 2.32, p = .025). No significant raise in oneness as a function of SCO was 
found in one of the other conditions b’s < -.42 ns. Figure 2.1 clarifies the combined 
effects of both the perspectives as well as SCO on these feelings of oneness.  




Effects of SCO on feelings of oneness in Objective, Other and Close-Other Conditions 
The results described above and visualised in Figure 2.1 clearly show that 
participants experienced more oneness when they were induced to imagine that the victim 
was a close-other. Yet, only within the other perspective there was a substantial 
relationship between SCO and oneness, with people high in SCO experiencing more 
oneness than people low in SCO. This moderating role of SCO was not expected in the 
close-other condition since all people should identify with the victim in that condition. 
Indeed, no relationship between SCO and oneness was found in the close-other 
condition. These findings are entirely in line with our expectations and seem to confirm 
that for people high in SCO a natural process of identification with the victim takes place. 
Empathy Just like in Study 2.1, SCO was also related to empathy in both other 
conditions but not in the objective condition. The findings indicate once more that 
people high in SCO experience more empathy when they imagine how the recipient must 
feel -indifferent of whether this person is a stranger or known to them- but not when they 
try to stay objective. 
Distress In Study 2.1 no correlation was found between SCO and distress in either 
of the conditions. In this study however, a substantial correlation was found between 
SCO and distress in the objective condition, with people high in SCO experiencing more 
distress than people low in SCO. It is important to interpret this finding with some 
caution since it was not found in Study 2.1. Yet, it seems likely that this correlation 
reflects the often reported higher levels of negative affect of people high in SCO when 
confronted with a downward comparison target (Buunk & Gibbons, 2005). Apparently, 



















experience higher levels of personal negative affect. Yet, when their direction of attention 
is clearly focused on the other person –i.e. by means of perspective taking– people high in 
SCO express a raise in empathy rather than a raise in self related negative affect. 
Remarkably, no correlations were found between empathy or distress and feelings 
of oneness in the close-other condition. Scatter plots revealed that this lack of 
relationship was most likely due to the strength of the manipulation in this condition. 
Although there was considerable variance in empathy and distress within the close-other 
condition, feelings of oneness were high regardless of this variance, and this has most 
likely suppressed the correlations. 
The results of this second study show some remarkable consistencies with those of 
Study 2.1. In general, people high in SCO tend to experience more empathy for a person 
in need when they shift their focus of attention to the recipient. Study 2.2 confirms that 
this raise in empathy is related to a process of identification with this person. People high 
in SCO experience more feelings of oneness with the recipient than people low in SCO, 
regardless whether they know the recipient or not. 
General Discussion 
These studies were conducted to investigate whether SCO plays a significant role 
in the effects of perspective taking on empathy and helping. They also shed a new light 
on the fact that people high in social comparison orientation repeatedly experience more 
negative affect when confronted with others who are worse off than themselves (Buunk 
& Gibbons, 2005; Van der Zee, Oldersma, Buunk, & Bos, 1998). We hypothesized that 
this reported negative affect might be an expression of their sensitivity towards, and 
sympathy with the suffering of others. Our findings suggest that this is indeed the process 
at hand, but only when people focus their attention on that other person. Study 2.1 
revealed that people high in SCO who imagine how a person in need must feel experience 
more empathy for this person than people low in SCO or people who try to stay 
objective. Study 2.2 not only replicated this result, but additionally showed that a process 
of identification with the victim takes place. People high in SCO naturally experience 
feelings of oneness when focusing their attention on the victim, whereas people low in 
SCO only experience oneness when experimentally induced to imagine the other close to 
them. Moreover, the empathy felt by people high in SCO was strongly related to the 
extent to which they experienced feelings of oneness with the victim.  
Some interesting puzzles arise from these studies that need further investigation. 
Now that we know that people high in SCO might be potential helpers by nature, the 
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question rises to what extent these people are naturally inclined to take the perspective of 
someone else. According to the studies that have shown that people high in SCO report 
higher levels of negative affect, one might expect they are not. Yet, these studies did not 
measure empathy in the first place. The reported negative affect might have been simply 
the result of their incapability to express their empathy for the victim. Also, the 
relationship between SCO and helping needs further investigation. Due to measurement 
issues, Study 2.2 did in part not replicate the findings in Study 2.1. Is there a direct link 
between SCO and willingness to help? Or is this relationship entirely mediated by feelings 
of empathy? 
The line of research on motivations to help others in need is known for its 
controversial outcomes and fierce discussions. Is it possible, as Batson (1991) states, that 
help can be motivated by an altruistic tendency? Or is it rather an egoistic motive like 
relieving one’s own negative affect that leads people to help others (Cialdini et al., 1987). 
The close-other perspective as well as the oneness measure have been extensively used 
before in research attempting to clarify that although motivations for helping might 
appear altruistic, those motivations may be ultimately egoistic in nature (Maner et al., 
2002; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). With the current research we did 
not intend to tap into this debate over the existence of ‘true’ altruism. We merely tried to 
determine whether the relationship between SCO and empathy was due to the underlying 
process of oneness (identification). Whether oneness is an egotistic motivation for 
helping is another question, which first needs further specification of its concepts. 
Obviously, the concept of ‘oneness’ and the concept of ‘empathy’ are interrelated under 
some circumstances. For those people who are naturally inclined to compare themselves 
with others this seems to be especially true.  
These findings complement and extend previous research, both on the effects of 
perspective taking in a person in need situation, as well as on ‘mapping’ the differences 
between people high and low in SCO. Complementing the work by Buunk and Gibbons 
(2005), these findings clarify the nature of the negative affect that is has repeatedly been 
found among people high in SCO in response to downward comparisons. First, this 
negative affect might stem from a process of identification with the other in need. 
Second, and more importantly, when their attention is channelled in a perspective on the 
other, this negative affect seems to be primarily an expression of sympathy for the person 
in need. People high in SCO are obviously more sensitive to the suffering of others than 
people low in SCO. This involvement can be channelled in such a way that it leads to a 




important predictor of peoples’ helping intentions, and is the first to demonstrate that this 
empathy results in part from a social comparison process.  
